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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty,1 
Randy Barnett begins by recalling his disillusionment as a Harvard law 
student with the study of constitutional law.  Once he finished Professor 
Laurence Tribe’s Constitutional Law course, he was “finished with the 
Constitution as well.  The idea of protecting liberty by imposing written 
constraints on the government was an experiment that obviously had 
failed.”2
 *  Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in Constitutional Law, Tulane Law School. 
 1. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY (2004). 
 2. Id. at x. 
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I think this somewhat idealistic reaction is not uncommon.  As a 
student, Barnett had expectations about constitutional law—that it 
should be about keeping government within strict limits guarded 
vigorously by the judiciary—that were not redeemed.  He now seeks to 
rescue constitutional law by turning the widely accepted presumption of 
constitutionality into the “presumption of liberty.”  From Barnett’s point 
of view, adopting the presumption of liberty is required to recover the 
original meaning of the necessary and proper clause, the Ninth 
Amendment, and the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as to provide protection for all enumerated and 
unenumerated constitutional liberties.  In making his case, Barnett 
provides the most detailed and coherent theory for a libertarian 
constitutional order with which I am familiar.  Everyone interested in 
American constitutional law and theory should read this intriguing book. 
Barnett has calibrated his theory carefully to avoid some of the 
problems common to “conservative” and libertarian theories.  He rejects 
the kind of originalism that looks for a subjective intent in favor of the 
“original meaning” (or original understanding) approach that scrutinizes 
the public meaning of the text of the Constitution.  He celebrates the 
rights-creating potential of the Ninth Amendment and pays close 
attention to the Fourteenth Amendment.3  Barnett’s theory might be 
described as “all rights, all the time.”  He embraces “liberal” rights such 
as the right to privacy and the right to travel while also insisting on 
strong protection for rights of contract and property.  He takes full 
advantage of recent historical scholarship that shows that the 
jurisprudence of the Lochner era was far closer to the values of the 
founding generation than most legal scholars have assumed.4
Despite the care with which Barnett has constructed his theory, I 
suspect many legal scholars will be dismissive when they learn that he 
calls for a return to pre-New Deal understandings of the Commerce and 
Due Process Clauses, as well as the application of something close to 
strict scrutiny of all federal and state legislation.  Indeed, Barnett’s book 
can be regarded as a sort of time capsule of what constitutional law 
might have looked like had the Great Depression and the New Deal not 
intervened.  But it would be unfortunate if this reaction prevented 
scholars from coming to grips with Barnett’s approach to constitutional 
 
 3. Barnett, however, barely mentions the Equal Protection Clause. 
 4. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE 
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1993) (viewing Lochner-era cases 
as a “serious, principled effort to maintain one of the central distinctions in nineteenth-
century constitutional law—the distinction between valid economic regulation, on the 
one hand, and invalid ‘class’ legislation on the other”). 
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law.  For scholars who value the document over the doctrine,5 Barnett’s 
textual purism has its attractions.  At least from the perspective of 
constitutional theory, there are some valuable lessons to be learned from 
Barnett’s libertarian approach, especially with respect to the importance 
of informal constitutional change in shaping American constitutionalism.6
The strengths of Barnett’s theory include his close attention to parts of 
the Constitution that have been neglected, a calm and even conversational 
tone, his clear-headed exposition, and the theory’s unity and coherence.  
The weaknesses are more difficult to summarize in brief.  Barnett’s book 
provides evidence that it is not possible to argue for a libertarian 
approach to the Constitution simply by offering an interpretation of its 
text.  Barnett’s argument depends on a controversial theory of political 
legitimacy brought in from outside the text in order to ensure that the 
nonlibertarian elements in American constitutionalism do not prevail.  
This need to rely on an external theory of legitimacy makes Barnett’s 
argument vulnerable to various important objections.  In addition, Barnett 
is in love with the idea of thinking about the Constitution as if it were a 
commercial contract, an especially implausible approach.  Further, his 
“original meaning” theory of interpretation is open to standard objections 
that he does not consider.  Finally, Barnett’s theory is afflicted by a certain 
historical weightlessness.7  In effect, he takes issue with those progressives 
who objected to Lochner-era jurisprudence and New Dealers who sought 
to change the constitutional order without considering their reasons.  At 
the same time, it should be said that Barnett’s theory at least enables us 
to gauge how far we have come from some of the normative commitments 
that underlay the 1787 Constitution. 
I will consider Barnett’s book in three stages.  In Part II, I criticize the 
external theory of political legitimacy that Barnett applies to the 
Constitution.  I argue that this theory had nothing to do with the actual 
reasons the Constitution was accepted as legitimate when it was ratified.  
In Part III, I focus on Barnett’s theory of constitutional interpretation and 
his account of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the foundation of the 
 5. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The 
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 133 (2000) (arguing that a “dense 
doctrinal grid threatens to obscure” the Constitution itself). 
 6. This is an important theme in my own work.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, 
Constitutional Theory Transformed, 108 YALE L.J. 2115, 2119 (1999) (arguing that the 
response to the Great Depression forced most constitutional change “off text” in the form 
of political change). 
 7. I am grateful to Keith Whittington for this point. 




“presumption of liberty.”  I also critique Barnett’s treatment of the Lochner 
era.  In Part IV, I examine Barnett’s approach to governmental power 
under the Constitution, particularly with respect to the Commerce 
Clause and the state police power. 
II.  THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
It might be thought that a theory that argues that the Constitution is 
more libertarian than most Americans think would have to focus first on 
showing how a reasonable interpretation of the text yields this result.  
Yet in Part I of his book, Barnett begins with the political theory behind 
the idea of government by consent.  He asks whether the Constitution is 
binding on us and is thus legitimate.8  In Barnett’s account, a constitution is 
legitimate if it creates a legal system in which citizens have a moral duty 
to obey the law.9  He asks, “is one morally obligated to obey any law that 
is enacted according to constitutional procedures?”10  The standard answer 
to this question within American constitutionalism is yes because “We 
the People” have consented to the Constitution and our form of 
government.  Barnett objects that the conditions for actual consent have 
never been met and could never be met.11  Therefore, he contends that if 
the Constitution is to be found legitimate, it must be on grounds other 
than actual consent.12
The fact that Barnett begins with political theory rather than 
constitutional interpretation is highly significant.  This suggests that a 
libertarian approach to the Constitution cannot get off the ground 
without the help of an external political theory.  But if the political 
theory of consent Barnett spins out does not have any substantial 
relationship to the Constitution, then we should question whether he is 
indeed providing us with a reliable account of the Constitution we 
actually have. 
Barnett examines and rejects various bases for contending that we 
have actually consented to obey the law.  One argument is that voting 
constitutes consent to obey the law.13  Another argument is that residency 
implies consent.14  Still another is that we are bound by the consent of 
the founders.15  This last argument is essentially an invocation of the 
doctrine of popular sovereignty and is a familiar element of the 
 8. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 11. 
 9. Id. at 12. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 14. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 17. 
 15. Id. at 19. 
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American constitutional tradition.  But Barnett challenges this argument.  
The Constitution, he says, was not approved by a unanimous vote or 
even a majority vote of all the people.16  Instead, it was approved by a 
majority of delegates to constitutional conventions.  Barnett asks, “How 
can a small minority of inhabitants presuming to call themselves ‘We the 
People’ consensually bind anyone but themselves?”17  For Barnett, 
consent of the minority or the individual cannot be inferred from the 
consent of the majority.18  No person can consent for another and thus 
the “consent of the governed” can work only if unanimous consent is 
obtained.19
A key assumption behind Barnett’s analysis is that the kind of consent 
required in the constitutional context is the same as the consent required 
to make a contract.  Barnett argues that having a “rule of recognition”—a 
sense that a legal system exists and is acquiesced to—is different from 
legitimacy.20  Ratification conventions can indeed supply an effective 
rule of recognition.21  But acquiescence to a legal order does not yield 
the kind of “moral duty” required by Barnett.22  Only actual consent by 
each and every individual can overcome this difficulty. 
Because unanimous consent is impossible in any practical constitutional 
order, consent must be replaced by an inquiry into whether the laws that 
are passed by the legal authorities are both necessary and proper.23  So 
Barnett will not condemn the Constitution to illegitimacy; rather, he will 
show how it is legitimate for reasons other than consent and popular 
sovereignty.  He will establish the essential conditions for constitutional 
legitimacy.24
I see two immediate problems with Barnett’s theory of constitutional 
legitimacy.  First, Barnett assumes that the key issue is the personal 
moral legitimacy of the Constitution to each and every individual rather 
than the political legitimacy of the Constitution to the people as a 
whole.25  Second, Barnett ignores the standard historical account of the 
 16. Id. at 20. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 21. 
 19. Id. at 21–22. 
 20. Id. at 22–23. 
 21. Id. at 23. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 24. 
 24. Id. at 31. 
 25. On the differences between moral and political obligation, see REX MARTIN, A 
SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 5–23 (1993). 




meaning of popular sovereignty.26  History leaves little doubt that the 
theory of legitimacy behind the Constitution was political, not moral (at 
least not moral in Barnett’s sense), and that the legitimacy of the 
Constitution was achieved on a collective, rather than an individualistic 
basis.27
Barnett is puzzled by the eighteenth century concept of popular 
sovereignty.  He asks how the founding generation could believe 
simultaneously in the “fiction”28 of popular sovereignty and at the same 
time distrust the people when they were divided into majority and 
minority factions.29  Unfortunately, Barnett does not discuss the historical 
meaning of popular sovereignty—that it was a way for the founding 
generation to express the extraordinary and indeed extralegal process by 
which the republic was founded.30  Critically, the founding generation 
learned how to put the abstract concept of popular sovereignty into 
practice by inventing the constitutional convention.31  It was this concrete 
institutionalization of sovereignty that is especially relevant to understanding 
why the Constitution was accepted as politically legitimate. 
With respect to constitutional conventions, Barnett says that ratification 
of the Constitution by such conventions “may contribute to, though not 
establish”32 its legitimacy.  He says that such a ratification process would 
have assured the people who participated in the process that the resulting 
legal system was legitimate.33  However, this “partial consent”34 through 
constitutional conventions was neither sufficient nor necessary to 
provide legitimacy to our legal system.35  For Barnett, ratification through 
constitutional conventions was not sufficient to establish the legitimacy 
of the Constitution because it did not provide a way in which literally 
each and every person in the United States could give or withhold his or 
her consent. 
Whatever one thinks of this theory of legitimacy by individual 
consent, it clearly has nothing to do with the normative reasons why the 
 26. See, e.g., SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 322–40 (1993); R.R. PALMER, 1 THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
REVOLUTION 213–35 (1959); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 382–83, 530–32, 596–600 (1969). 
 27. On the point that sovereignty was a collective concept, see WOOD, supra note 
26, at 382. 
 28. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 36. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See WOOD, supra note 26, at 306–43, 382–83. 
 31. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 
1459–62 (1987). 
 32. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 77. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 78. 
 35. Id. 
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Constitution was accepted as legitimate in the eighteenth century.  
Perhaps, however, Barnett means to judge the ratification process by the 
standards of a particular political theory in which he happens to believe.  
There is nothing wrong with this per se, but it fits badly with the overall 
thrust of his argument.  Barnett’s starting point is that governmental 
legitimacy in the United States has traditionally been founded on the 
consent of the governed.  The fact that Americans accept government by 
consent, however, certainly does not mean that they accept Barnett’s 
theory of government by unanimous consent.  As far as I can tell, no one 
in the eighteenth century advocated Barnett’s theory.  Barnett therefore 
cannot claim that his particular theory of consent has anything to do with 
traditional American standards for legitimate government. 
To put the point another way, Barnett builds a straw man and then 
knocks it down.  He claims that “[t]hose who justify a duty to obey the law 
on the basis of the ‘consent of the governed’ must explain exactly how 
and when ‘We the People’—you and me and everyone else—consented 
to obey the laws of the land.”36  This statement well illustrates Barnett’s 
view that the consent of the governed means the actual consent of each 
and every individual in the polity.  There is no prima facie reason, 
however, why someone who believes that the Constitution was made 
legitimate through popular sovereignty and ratification by constitutional 
conventions has to meet this burden.  The eighteenth century theory of 
popular sovereignty certainly was not based in such a radically 
individualistic account of consent. 
The eighteenth century theory of popular sovereignty or legitimacy 
was a political theory that rested on the idea that government derived 
“all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people.”37  
Such a collective body could act through special assemblies called 
constitutional conventions to ratify a proposed constitution.  Once ratified, 
the Constitution would operate as the fundamental law of the land and 
would be accepted as such by all.  This normative theory is close to what 
actually occurred following the signing of the Constitution in 1787.  
Close enough so that the American people accepted the Constitution as 
legitimate. 
Why is Barnett so concerned with individual (as opposed to collective) 
consent?  Barnett states that individuals have fundamental natural, 
 36. Id. at 14. 
 37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 251 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 




human, or background rights (it does not matter much to him what they 
are called) and for those rights to be effective, people must have a 
further right to withhold their consent to a lawmaking process.38  So 
rights precede government.  Lawmaking, however, can be legitimate in 
the absence of consent if it is just; that is, if it is “(1) necessary to protect 
the rights of others and (2) proper insofar as [it does] not violate the 
preexisting rights of the persons on whom they are imposed.”39
Barnett contends that the founding generation believed in natural 
rights, although he writes that there was not universal agreement about 
the content of those rights or the remedy for their violation.40  Further, 
natural rights were synonymous with the various liberties the people 
have before a government is formed.41  Here, the Ninth Amendment enters 
the picture.  The purpose of the Ninth Amendment was to guard against 
the possibility that the enumeration of rights in the Bill of Rights would 
be taken to mean that the other liberties had been given up.42  The 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also 
operates to guarantee these natural rights or liberties.43  Barnett argues that 
the founding generation was correct to believe in some form of natural 
rights.44  Such rights ensure a sphere of “bounded freedom”45—in which 
individuals pursue their own ends by using “the rights of several property, 
freedom of contract, first possession, self-defense, and restitution.”46
Throughout his argument on constitutional legitimacy and, indeed, 
much of the rest of the book, Barnett assumes that the Constitution 
should be analyzed as if it were a commercial contract.47  This 
assumption is deeply mistaken.  Contracts have a superficial similarity to 
constitutions in that both are agreements reduced to writing.  Focusing 
on agreement, however, does not isolate what makes contracts special 
and useful.  Commercial contracts are about exchange in the context of a 
market economy.  Focusing on agreement also does not isolate what makes 
constitutions special.  Constitutions structure politics and governmental 
institutions.  As I have argued elsewhere, they are a distinctive political 
practice.48
 38. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 44. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 54. 
 41. Id. at 57–58. 
 42. Id. at 59–60. 
 43. Id. at 60–68. 
 44. Id. at 78–80. 
 45. Id. at 82. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 22–25. 
 48. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO 
POLITICS 15 (1996). 
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Russell Hardin has usefully elaborated the differences between the 
Constitution and a contract.49  Hardin first draws a distinction among 
theories of social order based on conflict, shared values, exchange, and 
coordination.50  He argues that coordination theory is especially well 
suited to understanding the purpose of the American Constitution.  Hardin 
emphasizes: “A constitution does not resolve a particular exchange . . . .  
It regulates a long-term pattern of interactions.  It establishes conventions in 
the sociological or strategic sense that make it easier for us to cooperate 
and to coordinate in particular moments.”51  Constitutions help bring 
institutions like contracting into existence.  Hardin discusses two other 
differences between a constitution and a contract: while agreement is 
necessary for contracts, acquiescence is more important for constitutions; 
further, contracts are enforced through external sanctions while 
constitutions are self-enforcing.52
In support of his second point, Hardin notes that “[t]o come into being 
or to be effective, a constitution does not require universal or even 
widespread agreement.”53  One of the advantages of the 1787 Constitution 
is that it did not require the unanimous consent of the states, unlike the 
ill-fated Articles of Confederation.54  Obviously, many Americans did 
not in any way signal their acceptance of the Constitution.  One of the 
virtues of Hardin’s argument is that he is able to explain why the 
Constitution was a success even though it lacked unanimous agreement.  
As he states: 
A constitution does not commit the way a contract does.  Rather it merely raises 
the cost of trying to do things some other way through its creation of a 
coordination convention.  Moreover what it commits to is open to evolution and 
change in a far more expansive way than is the expectation of action under a 
contract.55
Once the Constitution began operating and showed some initial 
benefits, it could not be supplanted in the same way as the Articles of 
Confederation.  Its success bred more success.  As Hardin comments: 
“The Constitution of 1787 worked in the end because enough of the 
 49. See RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82–
140 (1999). 
 50. See id. at 9–12. 
 51. Id. at 86. 
 52. Id. at 88–89. 
 53. Id. at 107. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 111–12. 




relevant people worked within its confines long enough to get it 
established in everyone’s expectations that there was no point in not 
working within its confines.”56
Comparing the Constitution to a contract is also misleading because it 
implies that the Constitution is like an ordinary law.  As I have argued 
elsewhere, there are significant disanalogies between ordinary laws and 
the Constitution.57  First, the Constitution is the framework for the entire 
government and, as such, provides the structure for national politics as a 
whole.  Second, many of the Constitution’s most significant provisions 
are written in terms far more abstract than those commonly used in 
ordinary law (or contracts).  Third, as Hardin emphasizes, the Constitution 
cannot be enforced in the same way other laws can.58  When someone 
violates a contract, some external agency stands ready to enforce the 
contract and remedy the violation.  By contrast, constitutions must be 
self-enforcing.  In the constitutional sphere, there is no external agency 
available (if there were, it would not itself be subject to the constitution).  
Without an external agency, constitutions must ultimately be enforced 
by the operation of the entire political system or, one might say, by the 
people as a whole. 
Because the Constitution is not analogous to a contract, Barnett’s 
entire theoretical enterprise has difficulty getting off the ground.  First, 
his assumption that we must consent to the Constitution as we do to a 
contract does not hold and so the theory of legitimacy that follows from 
this assumption is therefore unsound.  Second, as I demonstrate below, 
the notion of the Constitution as contract causes Barnett to ignore the 
idea of the “living Constitution,” a well-known alternative to his account 
of constitutional interpretation.  This ultimately weakens the plausibility 
of Barnett’s theory of interpretation and thus his libertarian approach as 
a whole. 
III.  ORIGINAL MEANING AND THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
A.  Original Meaning and Constitutional Interpretation 
Having established to his satisfaction that the purpose of government 
is to protect the natural rights of liberty, Barnett moves to a consideration of 
the kind of constitutional method necessary to realize these rights.  
Barnett defends a version of originalism known as “original meaning,” 
which, in brief, focuses on the objective meaning that the words of the 
 56. Id. at 136. 
 57. See GRIFFIN, supra note 48, at 13–15. 
 58. See HARDIN, supra note 49, at 88–89; see also SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 5–6, 198–99 (1990). 
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Constitution had when it was written as opposed to the subjective intent 
of the framers.59  Barnett views originalism as following from the 
foundational commitment to have a written constitution and, like many 
originalists I have read, does not recognize any viable alternative method 
of interpretation.60  Barnett thinks that the most important reason some 
scholars oppose originalism is because they do not like its consequences 
for constitutional doctrine.61  He draws a distinction between what the 
Constitution says and whether we approve of it.  He contends that we 
should not choose a method of interpretation because of the outcomes it 
recommends.  That “puts the evaluative cart before the interpretive horse.”62
In keeping with his general theory, Barnett uses principles from 
contract law to illuminate constitutional interpretation.63  He argues, in 
an uncharacteristically weak fashion, that the fact that the Constitution is 
written makes contract law relevant given that contracts are in writing.64  
The original meaning approach to constitutional interpretation follows 
from “the commitment to a written text.”65  Barnett highlights the importance 
of “locking in” legal meaning.  Constitutions are put in writing in order 
to restrict future lawmakers and thus lock in a particular legal order.66  
Here Barnett develops a useful counter to those who see the Constitution 
as a living document.  He brings contract principles and constitutional 
interpretation together in a fruitful way: 
With a constitution, as with a contract, we look to the meaning established at the 
time of formation and for the same reason: If either a constitution or a contract 
is reduced to writing and executed, where it speaks it establishes or “locks in” a 
rule of law from that moment forward.  Adopting any meaning contrary to the 
original meaning would be to contradict or change the meaning of the text and 
thereby to undermine the value of writtenness itself.  Writtenness ceases to 
perform its function if meaning can be changed in the absence of an equally 
written modification or amendment.67
 59. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 89, 92. 
 60. Id. at 92. 
 61. Id. at 96. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 97, 100. 
 64. Id. at 100.  This syllogism seems a bit incomplete.  The fact that the Qur’an is 
in writing does not mean that its interpretive principles are relevant to American 
constitutional interpretation.  A closer relationship to the Constitution must first be 
established before this argument can get off the ground. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 103–05. 
 67. Id. at 105–06. 




In developing this interesting perspective on constitutional interpretation, 
Barnett does not come to grips with any significant opposing view.68  
This is unfortunate, because interpretation is the area of constitutional 
theory to which scholars have devoted the greatest attention.  Despite the 
wide variety of theories of interpretation, advocates of originalism like 
Barnett have tended to assume that it is the status quo.69  This is clearly 
mistaken, because it has not been the practice of the Supreme Court to 
adopt any one method of interpretation.70
The most accurate description of the Supreme Court’s practice is that 
it uses a plurality of methods of interpretation.  These different methods 
are the product of the reality that there are various authoritative sources 
of law in the United States.  Each theory of interpretation is grounded in 
a recognized source of law and draws strength from the authority of that 
source.71  Barnett’s theory illustrates this perfectly.  Barnett employs 
contract law to ground constitutional law.  He appeals to our sense that 
we live in a common law system and to a plausible, although flawed, 
analogy between the Constitution and a contract. 
Although constitutions are not like contracts, there is nothing wrong 
with the idea of illuminating the Constitution with principles drawn from 
other areas of American law.  It illustrates the process I have described 
as the “legalization” of the Constitution.72  Where Barnett goes wrong is 
to assume, without any real argument, that his preferred method of 
interpretation is the only legitimate method.  The idea of a plurality of 
methods, however, has been previously explored in depth by Philip 
Bobbitt, Richard Fallon, Robert Post, and in my own work.73  Their 
theories converge around the following methods of interpretation: textualism, 
history, precedent, inferences from the structure of the Constitution, and 
tradition.74
Barnett’s theory is compatible with two of the methods actually used 
by the Supreme Court: text and history (although, for Barnett, history is 
defined as the search for original meaning).  He does not mention any 
other method of interpretation.  This could be construed as a call for 
 68. For example, he remarks that “the opponents of originalism have never 
converged on an appealing and practical alternative.”  Id. at 92.  Leaving to one side the 
issue of why opponents of originalism must converge before Barnett is required to 
discuss their theories, this ignores the important practical question of whether the theory 
of original meaning is actually followed by the Supreme Court, and if it is, whether it is 
regarded by the Court as the only legitimate theory of interpretation as Barnett assumes. 
 69. Barnett is thus vulnerable to the criticism I made in GRIFFIN, supra note 48, at 
157–58. 
 70. Id. at 146–47. 
 71. I have developed this argument at length in id. at 143–52. 
 72. See id. at 144–47. 
 73. See id. at 143–52. 
 74. Id. at 148. 
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changing the status quo, except that Barnett does not recognize that the 
status quo includes more methods than the one he favors.  So he does not 
provide the kind of argument in favor of original meaning that he needs 
to.  The point is not to establish that original meaning is a legitimate 
theory of interpretation.  In light of the development of the American 
constitutional tradition, there is no doubt that it is.  Barnett’s burden is to 
establish why it is the only legitimate method of interpretation.  Barnett 
evades this burden by assuming, as many other originalists have done, 
that original meaning is the status quo.  This is clearly false. 
Barnett is also wrong to say that the only reason scholars oppose 
originalism is because of its consequences for doctrines they like.  
Scholars have argued that originalism is just as implausible as it is 
harmful.75  First, for the reasons I have reviewed, originalism is not the 
only legitimate method of constitutional interpretation.  Second, scholars 
have argued that originalism is a poor fit with much existing constitutional 
doctrine—it does not explain that doctrine and does not reflect the 
standard practice of the Supreme Court.  Third, scholars likely 
regard originalism as less plausible than the theory they think is 
most plausible—the idea that the Constitution is a “living” document.76
The idea of a living Constitution was well stated by Justice William 
Brennan: “[T]he genius of the Constitution rests not in any static 
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the 
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and 
current needs.”77  It is important to understand that a major element of 
the power of the living Constitution perspective is that it accords with a 
widespread understanding of how the American constitutional system 
has developed over time.  That is, the living Constitution perspective is 
accepted not just because it is perceived as normatively desirable, but 
because it is understood to be an accurate description of how American 
constitutionalism has actually worked.78
 75. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 196–97 (2004); DANIEL A. FARBER 
& SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 11–21 (2002). 
 76. See, e.g., FALLON, supra note 75, at 240, 269–70. 
 77. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 
23, 27 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990). 
 78. See Gordon S. Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, 35 N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Feb. 18, 1988, at 33, 39.  This point is well illustrated in Robert C. Post, The 
Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, 




It is telling that Barnett never discusses the living Constitution 
perspective as an alternative to originalism.  From this perspective, it is 
not possible to “lock in” the Constitution’s most famous abstract 
provisions.  The meaning of the Constitution changes not only because 
the circumstances to which it is applied change, but as the values and 
beliefs that inform the text change.79  Barnett wonders, in effect, why 
anyone who accepts this perspective would be interested in adopting a 
text that is difficult to amend.80  Why not just make up the Constitution 
as you go along?  I can imagine a number of replies here, but the most 
fundamental one is that living constitutionalists do not understand the 
Constitution to be a contract.  In general, the purpose of the Constitution 
is to frame the government, not to freeze in place a specific governing 
regime.  The Federalists believed in one sort of regime, Jeffersonians another, 
and New Deal Democrats yet a third.  Fortunately for the stability of our 
government, the Constitution’s broad generalities were compatible with all 
three.  From a living Constitution perspective, abstract language, not 
suitable for ordinary contracts, is appropriate in the constitutional case. 
The contrast between Barnett and living constitutionalists illustrates 
why I think the theory of constitutional change is fundamental for 
constitutional theory.81  Barnett’s lockbox theory of constitutional meaning 
illustrates the important role of constitutional change very well.  Barnett’s 
implied criticism of the living Constitution perspective is that one cannot 
hold this view without committing the error of amending the Constitution 
outside the procedures specified in Article V.  Barnett’s view of how 
legitimate constitutional change occurs is thus a key element in his 
argument for interpreting the Constitution by using original meaning. 
I have taken a somewhat detached perspective on the idea of the living 
Constitution because it has many strands, not all of which I agree with.  
Living constitutionalists often respond to Barnett’s challenge of “Why 
bother to have a written text?” by saying that it is important to have a 
continuous and vital constitutional tradition.  New interpretations are legal 
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35–41 (2003).  As Post states: “The question is 
not whether constitutional culture ought to be a source of constitutional law, because as a 
matter of history and structure constitutional interpretation is possible only because the 
Court engages in a continuous dialogue with the constitutional beliefs and values of 
nonjudicial actors.”  Id. at 41. 
 79. See Griffin, supra note 6, at 2148–56. 
 80. It is useful to compare Barnett’s theory to Christopher Eisgruber’s on this 
important point.  See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
10–25 (2001).  Eisgruber contends that “we should regard inflexible written constitutions, 
including the American one, as practical, procedural devices for implementing relatively 
ordinary, albeit non-majoritarian, conceptions of democracy.” Id. at 11.  Eisgruber thus 
argues that the purpose of an inflexible constitution is not primarily to bind future 
lawmakers (as Barnett would have it) but to guarantee democratic self-government. 
 81. See GRIFFIN, supra note 48; Griffin, supra note 6. 
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to the extent that they are consistent with the broad outlines of the 
Constitution and to its historical traditions.  Further, there is no point to 
amending the Constitution every time an unforeseen circumstance occurs 
because the genius of the document is precisely that it can serve to 
structure the government although more than two centuries have passed 
since its adoption. 
Matters look somewhat different from my historicist perspective.  
Instead of a continuous constitutional tradition, I have argued that the 
constitutional order has been broken and remade in various fundamental 
respects at several points in American history, most notably during 
Reconstruction and the New Deal.82  So my answer to Barnett on the 
question “Why have a Constitution?” is not the same as the answer 
given by the living constitutionalists.  To me, our constitutional 
“tradition” has discontinuities that are just as important to understanding 
American constitutionalism as are the continuities relied on by Barnett 
and the living constitutionalists.83
Further, the whole question of why we cannot amend the Constitution 
every time there is a significant change in circumstances is for me a far 
more complex matter than it is for Barnett or the living 
constitutionalists.  One answer to Barnett is that we cannot amend the 
Constitution in the way he suggests without endangering the stability of 
our form of government.  In general, Barnett underestimates the difficulty 
of amending the Constitution84 and he does not review the reasons 
(presented by James Madison in Federalist No. 49)85 why it is 
useful to have a document that is difficult to amend.  Someone who wants 
to be “up front” about making a significant change to the Constitution in the 
manner Barnett recommends is faced by a host of problems.  Americans 
often take suggestions for important constitutional amendments to be 
criticisms of our entire form of government (indeed, our way of life), not as 
reasonable reforms in the light of changing circumstances (as Barnett 
would have it).  Because the Constitution is the focus of strong patriotic 
sentiments, it is difficult to change even when such a change is 
necessary.86  This forces responsible constitutional actors to seek means 
of constitutional change other than amendment, including judicial 
 82. See GRIFFIN, supra note 48, at 36; Griffin, supra note 6, at 2115–16. 
 83. Griffin, supra note 6, at 2148. 
 84. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 351. 
 85. I review these reasons in GRIFFIN, supra note 48, at 29–30. 
 86. Id. at 39. 




interpretation and ordinary politics.87
Barnett states that not all constitutional provisions will be susceptible 
to originalist interpretation.  Provisions that are vague or abstract must be 
construed, rather than interpreted, when applied to new circumstances 
outside their core meaning.88  Barnett employs Keith Whittington’s concept 
of constitutional “construction”89 to fill in the gap between vague provisions 
and cases unforeseen by the framers.90  Such construction should be guided 
by originalist methods and constitutional principles such as separation of 
powers and federalism.91  The political question doctrine is an example 
of a construction of the Constitution.92  According to Barnett, Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison93 is another clear 
example of constitutional construction.94  But perhaps most important 
for Barnett’s overall argument, the presumption of constitutionality itself 
is a constitutional construction, rather than an interpretation of the 
Constitution.95  This makes it easier from him to argue that it should be 
replaced by the presumption of liberty. 
B.  Necessary and Proper and the Presumption of Liberty 
Barnett now moves to his central concern: replacing the presumption 
of constitutionality normally accorded by the judiciary to legislation 
with the “presumption of liberty.”  To do this, he must first undermine 
the traditional interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.96  
Barnett notes that Federalists maintained that the clause “was not an 
additional freestanding grant of power, but merely made explicit what 
was already implicit in the grant of each enumerated power.”97  He then 
reviews the famous 1791 debate over the constitutionality of a national 
bank, devoting particular attention to the views of then-Representative 
James Madison.98  Barnett does not say as much about the opinions 
offered by Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton99 and Chief 
 87. Id. at 45. 
 88. See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 119–20. 
 89. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–2 (1999). 
 90. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 121–22. 
 91. Id. at 125. 
 92. Id. at 129. 
 93. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 94. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 144–47. 
 95. Id. at 151–52. 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 97. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 155. 
 98. Id. at 158–64. 
 99. See 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97–134 (Harold C. Syrett et. al. 
eds., 1965). 
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Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,100 often taken by scholars to 
be the sine qua non of constitutional arguments.101  Because most judges 
and scholars have found these opinions persuasive, Barnett’s road in 
opposing them is steeply uphill all the way.102
Unfortunately, Barnett’s overall argument and his account of the 1791 
debate are quite partial103 and do not, for example, take into consideration 
the persuasive replies made in the House of Representatives to 
Madison’s argument against the bank.104  Ironically, those replies drew 
on Madison’s own defense of the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
Federalist No. 44.105  There, Madison stated: “Without the substance of 
this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter.”106  The main 
problem with Barnett’s argument is that the House of Representatives 
and the Senate of the United States, both crowded with framers and 
ratifiers of the 1787 Constitution, accepted the constitutional arguments 
of the supporters of the bank and rejected Madison’s newfound 
concerns.  This is strong evidence that the original meaning of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause supported the constitutionality of a 
national bank and that Barnett’s position was considered and rejected in 
1791. 
But there is more.  After the bank bill passed Congress, President George 
Washington asked his advisors for their constitutional opinions.107  
Attorney General Edmund Randolph and Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson argued against the constitutionality of the bank.108  As I have 
 100. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 101. See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 166–71.  On the high esteem in which 
Hamilton’s argument is held, see RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & KYM S. RICE, ARE WE TO BE 
A NATION?: THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 256 (1987). 
 102. Barnett does say that Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch can be read to support a 
more circumscribed view of the necessary and proper power than is common.  BARNETT, 
supra note 1, at 176–77.  He argues that the clause was thought to be justiciable.  Id. at 
178.  But because of McCulloch’s vast influence, “the enumeration of powers has largely 
been vitiated as a limitation on the scope of the national government . . . .”  Id. at 183. 
 103. Id. at 158–66. 
 104. For more complete accounts, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
CONGRESS 78–80 (1997); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 
226–34 (1993). 
 105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 302–05 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
 106. Id. at 303. 
 107. For a good recent discussion of the advisory opinions on the bank, see H. 
JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY 
AND POLITICS 21–30 (2002). 
 108. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 165–66. 
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noted, Hamilton argued in favor.109  President Washington was convinced 
by Hamilton’s arguments and signed the bill into law.  At a minimum, 
this shows that there is strong evidence that the original meaning of the 
necessary and proper clause is not what Barnett says it is.  More 
important, it is very unlikely that President Washington, the “Father of 
our Country,” would have signed the bank bill had it been obvious (as 
Barnett would have it) that the bank violated the original meaning of the 
Constitution. 
I agree with Barnett that Chief Justice Marshall’s view of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause did not make it into a de facto grant of 
plenary power to the federal government.  McCulloch might be read that 
way by contemporary judges and scholars, but, as Barnett says, there are 
many indications that this is not how Marshall understood his opinion.110  
But it does not follow that accepting Hamilton’s justification of the 
constitutionality of the bank meant that the doctrine of enumerated 
powers was dead.  It turned out that the national government had more 
constitutional power than Jefferson and Madison were willing to 
acknowledge in the 1790s.  Both men, however, had occasion to revisit 
the issue of national power in a way that ultimately showed Hamilton 
had the better of the argument – Jefferson endorsed the constitutionally 
questionable Louisiana Purchase and Madison eventually endorsed the 
national bank.111
Barnett, however, does believe that accepting Hamilton’s interpretation 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause means that the judiciary cannot 
appropriately oversee the exercise of constitutional power.  Here Barnett 
makes an argument about judicial deference that appears throughout the 
book.  Allowing lawmakers the authority to change constitutional meaning 
implies that they can determine the scope of their own authority and so 
“places the rights of everyone at peril.”112  By Barnett’s logic, this means 
that once a clause, such as the Necessary and Proper Clause, is shown to 
be justiciable, it follows that deferential review by the judiciary is 
 
 109. Barnett does not really respond to Hamilton’s arguments.  He says that in 
evaluating Hamilton’s argument, we should keep in mind that Hamilton argued for an 
extreme form of consolidated government at the Federal Convention.  Id. at 167.  But 
Hamilton apparently retained the confidence of the Convention, participating on the 
Committee on Style and Arrangement near the end of the Convention.  BERNSTEIN & 
RICE, supra note 101, at 197.  Further, as co-author of The Federalist, judges and 
scholars recognize Hamilton as an authoritative exponent of the Constitution’s meaning.  
The underlying problem Barnett does not come to grips with is the phenomenon of 
framers and ratifiers disagreeing among themselves as to the original meaning of the 
Constitution. 
 110. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 176–77. 
 111. For a useful discussion, see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98–100 (14th ed. 2001). 
 112. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 107. 
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inappropriate.113  Deferential review, such as the use of the “rational 
basis” standard, would grant Congress an “unlimited discretion”114 to do 
as it sees fit. 
Here Barnett runs together several issues that should be kept distinct.  
There is little doubt that the judiciary can take cognizance of whether 
Congress has violated the Necessary and Proper Clause.  But the availability 
of judicial review has no obligatory implications for the standard of 
review that the Court should apply.  Further, the lack of what Barnett 
would regard as meaningful review does not mean that Congress is at 
liberty to do whatever it wants.  Members of the founding generation, 
such as James Madison, were quite clear on this point.115  Because the 
people were the ultimate sovereign, they were also the ultimate backstop 
should the checks and balances specified in the Constitution fail.  
Finally, Barnett is ignoring the issue of the relative institutional competence 
of the judiciary, an issue that became important during the Lochner era, 
as I discuss below. 
Barnett then considers the meaning of the word “proper” in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  Following an article by Lawson and 
Granger,116 he contends that “proper” means that the law must not 
violate principles of separation of powers and federalism and also must 
not violate background rights retained by the people.117  A law is also 
improper under the Necessary and Proper Clause if it is “intended by 
Congress to accomplish an improper end,”118 one not sanctioned by the 
enumeration of powers in Article I, section 8. 
Barnett next turns to the question of whether the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a meaningful restriction 
on the power of state governments.  He criticizes the Slaughter-House 
Cases for deviating from the original meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause as shown by the congressional debates.119  He 
endorses the position taken by the dissenters that the purpose of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause was to secure the liberties of contract 
 113. See id. at 178–84. 
 114. Id. at 179. 
 115. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 105, at 302–05. 
 116. Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 271–73 (1993). 
 117. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 186. 
 118. Id. at 189. 
 119. Id. at 195–202. 




and property.120  Barnett notes that this view was eventually vindicated 
in the Supreme Court’s “economic” substantive due process jurisprudence 
in the Lochner era.121  Thus, for Barnett, the textual criticism of the Court’s 
“substantive” due process jurisprudence during the Lochner era is 
largely beside the point.  Because he believes that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly authorizes 
the Court to carry out judicial review of state legislation to see whether 
rights of contract and property (among others) have been violated, the 
“doctrine of ‘substantive due process’ restores rather than violates the 
original historical meaning of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
taken as a whole from the damage done by Slaughter-House.”122  Barnett 
thus comes to praise Lochner-era jurisprudence, not to bury it. 
Barnett’s discussion of Lochner-era jurisprudence is prefaced by some 
observations on the larger historical forces that influenced legislation 
and the courts during this period.  He names some ideological shifts such 
as “the rise of scientific empiricism,”123 increased “disparity of incomes,”124 
mass immigration, and the influence of “the German socialist model.”125  
Barnett also believes that the Civil War “enhanc[ed] the moral authority 
of the central government.”126  Indeed, he goes further to contend that 
the Civil War reversed the traditional American distrust of centralizing 
government.127  These comments are more interesting for what they 
show about Barnett’s point of view than their limited relation to what 
historians regard as the most important developments of the Populist-
Progressive era.128
One important development Barnett does not mention that belongs to 
any history of postbellum America was the rise of industrial capitalism 
 120. Id. at 198. 
 121. Id. at 203. 
 122. Id. at 208. 
 123. Id. at 204. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 204–05. 
 128. For a recent useful overview, see MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1920 (2003).  
Legal historian William Wiecek has developed an alternative list of the important 
changes that had an effect on law during this period: (1) nonagricultural production now 
took place in factories rather than workshops; (2) widespread formation of labor unions, 
with fierce resistance by employers; (3) emergence of corporate capitalism; (4) increase 
in influence of investment banking firms or finance capitalism; and (5) formation of 
national economic and professional organizations.  WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST 
WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937, at 
65 (1998).  On the persistence of localism in American government after the Civil War, 
see MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
AMERICA (1977). 
GRIFFIN 4/7/2005  10:21 AM 
[VOL. 42:  283, 2005] Barnett and the Constitution We Have Lost 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 303 
 
and what was called the “Labor Question.”129  From a constitutional 
perspective, the question that troubled many was how republican government 
was consistent with the rise of a permanent class of subordinate laborers 
who had no realistic prospect of being proprietors or entrepreneurs.  
Without some reference to this important issue, Barnett does not have a 
sure footing to understanding the constitutional background of the 
Lochner era. 
Barnett refers, somewhat mysteriously, to “the pervasiveness of 
political motives in conflict with the original constitutional scheme of 
limited powers.”130  He argues that, in such a situation, the courts could 
not simply defer to legislative findings that it was necessary to regulate 
economic activity on the basis of the police power.131  Barnett defends 
the Lochner decision as embodying the conception of privileges or 
immunities held by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.132  Like a 
number of contemporary scholars, Barnett rejects Justice Holmes’s 
dissent as being out of step with both the jurisprudence of the early 
twentieth century and our own.133  He notes the existence of exceptions 
to the liberty of contract doctrine, but says that the fact that the right 
existed negated any implication that the Court necessarily had to defer to 
the legislature.134  According to Barnett, the Court in the Lochner era 
was following the proper course of action, observing what he calls “the 
presumption of liberty” and holding legislatures to high standards of 
proof.  He notes that the presumption was occasionally successfully 
rebutted, as in Muller v. Oregon,135 the case that featured the famous 
“Brandeis brief.”136
I agree with several themes in Barnett’s discussion of the Lochner era, 
if not his evaluation of Lochner itself.  I agree that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause has a substantive meaning beyond that recognized in 
the Slaughter-House Cases.137  I agree also that Lochner was at least 
 129. See William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 25–51 (1999). 
 130. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 211. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 215. 
 133. Id. at 214–17. 
 134. Id. at 218. 
 135. 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (upholding the constitutionality of state law 
restrictions on the working hours of females). 
 136. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 218–19. 
 137. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (affirming the decision that Lousiana had the 
exclusive right to determine slaughterhouse locations under its police powers and that the 




defensible by the legal norms that existed at the time, as demonstrated 
by Howard Gillman and many other historians.138  Barnett emphasizes 
Gillman’s work in order to show that Lochner was supported by the 
original meaning of the Due Process Clause.139  On the other hand, 
Barnett does not give much attention to considering why Lochner and 
the Lochner era were and continue to be controversial. 
If so much of what happened in the Lochner era was supported by 
precedent and our constitutional tradition, how is it that this era also saw 
the emergence of a still powerful critique emphasizing democratic limits 
on judicial power?  To my mind, historians and legal scholars have not 
yet fully answered this question.  However, it appears that the circumstances 
of the early twentieth century were fertile grounds for doubts about the 
way the constitutional system was working.140  Growing numbers of lawyers 
and legal scholars were becoming alienated from the constitutional 
tradition that Lochner represented.  To give one example, even before 
the Lochner era had properly begun, law students such as future judge 
Learned Hand were absorbing the lesson of skepticism about rule by the 
judiciary from influential teachers such as Harvard’s James Bradley 
Thayer.141  Indeed, Hand wrote one of the most influential contemporary 
critiques of the Lochner decision.142
As demonstrated by Hand, part of the problem was that there was 
plenty of evidence that the Court disagreed with the legislation as a 
matter of policy, not just constitutional principle.  The Court showed an 
“ill-concealed hostility toward the trend to regulate employer-employee 
relations for the latter’s protection.”143  For Hand, the question of the 
economic merits of laws restricting hours of work were for the 
legislature to determine.144  Hand said that what was required was 
experimentation with the right balance in employer-employee relations, 
and the judiciary was unsuited for this task.145  Crucially, Hand 
commented: “That the legislature may be moved by faction, and without 
justice, is very true, but so may even the court.  There is an inevitable 
bias upon such vital questions in all men, and the courts are certainly 
Federal Constitution did not apply). 
 138. See GILLMAN, supra note 4, at 10–12.  For discussion, see GRIFFIN, supra note 
48, at 99–104. 
 139. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 222. 
 140. Id. at 211. 
 141. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 50–53 (1994). 
 142. Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. 
REV. 495 (1907–1908). 
 143. GUNTHER, supra note 141, at 120. 
 144. Id. at 121. 
 145. Id. at 122. 
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recruited from a class which has its proper bias, like the rest.”146
Class conflict and, in particular, the often violent conflicts between 
labor and capital during this period posed a grave challenge to the 
continuity of the American constitutional tradition.  The judiciary could 
accommodate this change up to a point, but on the question of whether 
laws regulating conditions of labor were constitutional, judges found it 
difficult to steer a path that would give something to both sides.  As 
Hand perceived, the consequence was that the rule of law was no longer 
understood to be neutral.  Once this occurred, a univocal constitutional 
tradition could not be maintained.  Eventually, during the New Deal, the 
new tradition represented by judges like Hand and Chief Justice Harlan 
Stone won the day.147
Barnett then assesses the origins of the presumption of constitutionality.  
He believes that the presumption was used to evade the requirement of 
showing that legislation was a true necessity under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.148  Here Barnett telescopes a great deal of doctrinal 
development to contend that the advent of the presumption of 
constitutionality and rational basis review threatened to “swallow the 
entire constitutional practice of judicial review.”149  In his view, the 
Carolene Products footnote150 was necessary in order to establish a 
meaningful role for the Court in a post-necessary and proper world.  
Barnett calls this world “Footnote Four-Plus,” the label signifying that, 
after Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court was willing to protect those 
rights enumerated in the Constitution, plus other specific unenumerated 
rights under a revived substantive due process doctrine.151
Barnett considers Footnote Four-Plus to be a pretty thin recipe for 
constitutional rights.  He believes that the Ninth Amendment provides a 
firm foundation for protecting many rights beyond those recognized in 
the Footnote Four-Plus regime.152  He steps back to describe four 
approaches judges can take toward legislation that violates constitutional 
rights.  The first is judicial deference—the presumption of constitutionality 
 146. See Hand, supra note 142, at 508. 
 147. There is an important article on this point by Robert McCloskey that Barnett 
does not cite.  See Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme 
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34 (1962). 
 148. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 225–28. 
 149. Id. at 229. 
 150. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 151. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 232. 
 152. Id. at 234–42. 




should be applied to all legislation affecting rights.153  Second is the 
approach of Footnote Four to reverse the presumption when legislation 
infringes on rights specified in the Constitution.  Among other problems, 
this approach conflicts with both the Ninth Amendment and the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.154  Third would be the “Footnote Four-
Plus” approach that would add protection of some unenumerated rights. 
None of these alternatives suit Barnett.  His preferred approach is “to 
protect all the rights retained by the people equally whether enumerated 
or unenumerated.”155  He then faces the problem of specifying the 
retained unenumerated rights.  Barnett’s general method, of course, is to 
search historical evidence for the original meaning of the text.  There is 
certainly no shortage of historical materials from the eighteenth century 
on the subject of rights.  But Barnett also believes, consistent with 
members of the founding generation, such as James Wilson, that “it is 
impossible to specify in advance all the rights we have.”156  The best 
way to deal with this inability to specify all the rights of liberty is not to 
work harder at constructing a list, but rather to embrace the “Presumption of 
Liberty.”157  Under this presumption, the government has the burden “to 
establish the necessity and propriety of any infringement on individual 
freedom.”158
Barnett believes the presumption of liberty has several advantages.  It 
is consistent with the original meaning of the text.159  Courts will no 
longer have to decide which rights merit “fundamental” status, as they 
currently do under the substantive due process doctrine.160  But he also 
believes that the new presumption is justified by our experience with 
how legislatures work.  He says that the presumption of constitutionality 
was based on the idea that legislatures would carefully consider 
constitutional protections of liberty before infringing rights.161  We have 
learned, however, how the interest group state really works.  Sometimes 
legislation serves majority interests, sometimes minority interests, but 
the legislature rarely cares about whether statutes meet the “necessary 
and proper” standard.162  Judicial review is required to bring the 
constitutional system back into balance to prevent legislatures from 
 153. Id. at 253. 
 154. Id. at 253–54. 
 155. Id. at 254. 
 156. Id. at 259. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 260. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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being the sole judges of their own powers.163  At this point, Barnett’s 
argument contains more than an echo of the eighteenth century 
distinction between reason and will:164 “Without judicial review, statutes 
are mere exercises of will, and are not entitled to the same presumption 
of respect that attaches to statutes surviving meaningful scrutiny.”165  
Barnett’s position might be summarized as strict scrutiny across the 
board. 
It is strict scrutiny, however, with a certain structure.  To satisfy the 
presumption of liberty, laws must be shown either to “prohibit wrongful 
or regulate rightful activity . . . .”166  Wrongful activity is an action that 
violates the rights of others.167  The baseline for distinguishing rightful 
from wrongful conduct is basically the common law.  Barnett imports 
the standards of private law in order to make sense of what the 
presumption of liberty means for constitutional law.  He allows legislative 
alteration of common law rights, but with judicial review to ensure that 
the legislative purpose is to “correct doctrinal errors”168 rather than 
“invade individual rights.”169  In general, if legislation is designed to 
attain a “desirable social policy”170 rather than prohibit wrongful 
behavior or regulate rightful behavior, it will be beyond the power of the 
legislature and hence unconstitutional. 
The presumption of liberty would obviously place more power in the 
hands of judges.  Barnett acknowledges this only to say immediately that 
it is unavoidable171 (this is not very reassuring).172  In general, Barnett 
 163. Id. at 261. 
 164. See generally PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT 
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 98–99 (1992) (discussing two antebellum 
understandings of the Constitution: as a “practical application of an abstract science of 
politics” and as a “historically unique expression of the will of the popular sovereign”). 
 165. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 261. 
 166. Id. at 262. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 263. 
 169. Id. at 264. 
 170. Id. at 265. 
 171. Id. at 266. 
 172. Barnett’s position on checking the judiciary is puzzling.  He writes that if judges 
overstep their bounds enforcing the natural liberties of all, they may be checked by 
constitutional amendment or even the judicial appointment process.  Id. at 268.  This is a 
strange concession for a libertarian to make.  To stay consistent, Barnett should be searching 
for ways to make it impossible to place nonlibertarian judges on the bench.  Otherwise, their 
constitutionally valid decisions would be overturned as soon as they became unpopular with 
the people.  Barnett objects to the idea of voting on what rights we have, but allowing judges 
to be checked through the appointment process would have the same effect. 




has trouble seeing the point of institutional objections to increased 
judicial power and the influence these objections have had over theories 
of judicial review since scholars like Thayer and Hand first advanced 
them.173  This is directly relevant to the way he develops his argument in 
favor of the presumption of liberty.  The justification for the presumption of 
constitutionality was rooted in the experience of the Lochner era with 
the institutional limitations of courts, not, as Barnett believes, out of an 
expectation that legislatures would always behave constitutionally.  The 
Lochner generation learned that it was difficult to tell whether legislation 
was invading protected rights or promoting a desirable social policy.  In 
addition, lawyers and judges discovered that the common law did not 
provide any way to address complex social and economic problems.  
Legislation could therefore not be confined, as Barnett would have it, to 
correcting the occasional judicial error. 
Barnett tries to defend the Lochner era without confronting any of the 
most substantial reasons why generations of lawyers since have thought 
it represented a deeply flawed judicial attempt to obstruct legislative 
efforts to deal with important social problems.  His reconstruction of 
how the principles of the Lochner era could operate in our own time 
through the presumption of liberty is interesting but ultimately fruitless 
in the absence of an attempt to come to grips with the most common 
critiques of the Lochner era. 
IV.  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE STATE POLICE POWER 
In the last part of the book, Barnett considers specific constitutional 
powers such as the federal government’s power to regulate the economy 
under the Commerce Clause.  From his point of view, it is the Commerce 
Clause “that has most often been used by Congress to restrict the 
liberties of the people.”174  Barnett considers two alternative interpretations 
of the commerce clause: the pre-New Deal understanding that it is 
“limited to trade or exchange of goods”175 and excludes manufacturing 
and agriculture, and a broad interpretation that it applies “to any gainful 
activity.”176  It is puzzling that Barnett does not consider an obvious 
alternative: that “commerce” in the context of today’s national economy 
means commercial activity.177
 173. For a recent example of an institutional analysis of the limitations of the 
judiciary, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT 46–60 (1999) (arguing that good judges attempt to minimize potentially 
adverse effects of their holdings by adopting change incrementally). 
 174. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 277. 
 175. Id. at 278. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
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Barnett argues with plentiful evidence that the original meaning of the 
commerce clause validates pre-New Deal understandings that it 
excluded regulation of agriculture or manufacturing.  He endorses the 
reading of the Commerce Clause the Supreme Court gave in United 
States v. E.C. Knight Co.178 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.179  As a 
historical matter, I can hardly disagree, because I have defended 
elsewhere180 the idea that the New Deal understanding of the commerce 
clause as a broad charter to regulate the economy did not have anything 
to do with Chief Justice Marshall’s understanding of its more limited 
purpose in Gibbons v. Ogden.181  As Barnett notes, even on Marshall’s 
understanding, commerce “among the several States” did not include 
purely intrastate commerce.182  Although New Dealers such as future 
justice Robert Jackson saw themselves as restoring the original 
understanding of the Commerce Clause, their arguments are not 
supported by historical evidence.183
Barnett goes on to argue that the original meaning of “to regulate” in 
the Commerce Clause did not include the power to prohibit goods from 
moving in interstate commerce.184  He excoriates the “aggregate effects” 
doctrine recognized in Wickard v. Filburn185 as having “nearly destroyed 
the system of limited enumerated powers.”186  He also rejects the 
“articles of commerce” doctrine that allows Congress the power to 
regulate activity based on goods that have moved in interstate 
commerce.187  He claims that “an interconnected economy was far from 
unforeseen by the founders”188 on the basis of a single quotation from 
James Madison.189  Barnett appears to be claiming that the framers saw 
 178. 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895). 
 179. 298 U.S. 238, 301 (1936).  Barnett also endorses Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence in Lopez, in which Thomas argued in favor of reestablishing the pre-New 
Deal understanding of the commerce clause.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 596 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 180. See Griffin, supra note 6, at 2121–42. 
 181. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 182. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 297. 
 183. See generally Griffin, supra note 6. 
 184. See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 302–06. 
 185. 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
 186. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 315. 
 187. Id. at 316. 
 188. Id. at 315. 
 189. In the midst of his argument about the meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, Barnett pauses to claim that Madison realized, just as we do, “that the national 
economy is interconnected.”  Id. at 172.  This claim is supported by a letter written by 




the consequences of a commerce clause limited to the trade of goods 
among states and rejected the alternative of allowing Congress a broader 
power to regulate the national economy.  This is highly doubtful, 
because a national market in which agriculture and manufacturing were 
key sectors of an interstate commercial economy did not exist in the 
eighteenth century. 
Barnett’s discussion of the Commerce Clause is so aggressively rooted 
in the different economic world of the eighteenth century that it enables 
us to see the tremendous distance between that world and our own.  I 
therefore agree with Barnett that the New Deal marked a true 
“revolution, not a restoration”190 in constitutional law.191  The problem is 
then to explain how the New Deal revolution was legitimate, given that 
it was not made through an Article V amendment to the text of the 
Constitution. 
For Barnett, of course, this is not a problem but an opportunity to 
show how commerce clause doctrine cannot be made legitimate except 
by returning to the pre-New Deal understanding that agriculture, 
manufacturing, and conditions of labor are beyond the regulatory power 
of the federal government.  If this poses a problem for the operation of 
the economy and workplace conditions, Barnett thinks it is better to 
require a constitutional amendment, rather than (as was done during the 
New Deal) changing the meaning of the Constitution through judicial 
fiat.192  Throughout the book, Barnett seems to assume that if Americans 
dislike the implications of restoring the Constitution that was “lost” 
through Supreme Court interpretation, they will find it relatively easy to 
pass constitutional amendments to update the text in light of contemporary 
circumstances.193  The experience of the New Deal can help us understand 
why this assumption is problematic. 
Madison to Judge Roane in which he stated: 
In the great system of political economy, having for its general object the 
national welfare, everything is related immediately or remotely to every other 
thing; and, consequently, a power over any one thing, if not limited by some 
obvious and precise affinity, may amount to a power over every other thing. 
Id.  This claim is not plausible and is not supported by this evidence.  It is not plausible 
because the economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that caused 
judges and scholars to think that times had changed did not exist in 1819, when Madison 
wrote this letter.  The economy of 1819 was predominantly agrarian and not dominated 
by large industrial corporations.  Further, it is likely that Madison’s point was logical, 
not empirical.  One plausible reading of this passage is that Madison was claiming that in 
“political economy,” there was at least a remote causal connection between every person.  
This does not entail the further set of claims characteristic of modern commerce clause 
jurisprudence, such as those made in cases that upheld New Deal legislation. 
 190. Id. at 332. 
 191. See Griffin, supra note 6, at 2117–19. 
 192. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 352–53. 
 193. Id. at 351. 
GRIFFIN 4/7/2005  10:21 AM 
[VOL. 42:  283, 2005] Barnett and the Constitution We Have Lost 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 311 
 
Although Barnett notes in passing that President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
rejected the option of seeking an amendment to justify the changes he 
sought,194 he does not consider the possibility that this outcome was 
dictated by the structure of the constitutional order, rather than just being 
a missed opportunity.195  In assessing potential amendments, Roosevelt 
was not writing on a blank slate but rather operating in a context created 
by Supreme Court decisions.  This complicated his task considerably.  
The “Old Court” that was hostile to the New Deal would presumably be 
in charge of interpreting any constitutional amendment.  If the amendment 
was drafted in broad terms, the Court might be able to undermine it 
through a narrow construction of its general provisions.  If the amendment 
was drafted narrowly to overturn specific precedents, then it might not 
apply to all the circumstances in which the government needed new 
powers.196
In addition, by the time of the New Deal it was no longer possible for 
anyone to view the Constitution as a practical plan of government in the 
same way as the founding generation.  By now, the Constitution was 
revered as the cornerstone of the American political system.  That made 
the Constitution an exceptionally stable basis for government, but also 
made it very difficult to change.197  The Constitution was seen as an 
ideal by which government should be judged and was the focus of strong 
patriotic sentiments.  These sentiments led Americans to see potential 
constitutional amendments as implying that the American constitutional 
and political order was defective.  President Roosevelt had no intention 
of leading Americans to believe that their most fundamental institution 
was flawed.  Hence, he opted for the position that the problem was with 
the Court, not the Constitution.198
Barnett assumes that if the Constitution needs to be updated in light of 
changing circumstances, such as our desire to regulate labor unions and 
workplace conditions, it can be changed in much the same way as we 
update obsolete statutes.  If, however, the Constitution is resistant to 
even reasonable changes, then this stance becomes problematic.  It is 
possible that Barnett would not see this as a problem, but as evidence 
that there is no need for change in the first place.  On the other hand, he 
 194. Id. at 109. 
 195. GRIFFIN, supra note 48, at 37–39. 
 196. Id. at 38. 
 197. Id. at 39. 
 198. Id. 




does not offer any argument to persuade those who see regulating 
conditions of labor as a reasonable adaptation of the Commerce Clause 
to changed circumstances.  Indeed, Barnett’s entire argument on the 
Commerce Clause is notably devoid of detail on just what liberties are 
being infringed by the contemporary understanding that it is a broad 
charter to regulate interstate commercial activity.  What would we gain 
if we returned to pre-New Deal baselines?  Barnett asserts that the 
Commerce Clause has most often been the instrument through which 
Congress restricts the liberties of the people.199  I doubt, however, that 
anyone sees it that way except for libertarians who already agree with 
Barnett’s political theory. 
Barnett then considers the effect of the presumption of liberty on the 
state police power.  From the perspective of the federal Constitution, 
state police powers are limited primarily by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
But Barnett has trouble specifying the nature of the limits on the state 
police power because he does not believe that the liberties protected by 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause can be reduced to a list.  His method 
is to test all legislative enactments by whether they are necessary and 
proper, yet there is no list of the enumerated powers of state legislatures 
in the Constitution.200  This poses an interpretive problem that he wants 
to solve by using his version of “constitutional construction,” the method 
we must employ when we are forced to go beyond original meaning.201  
Barnett does not consider whether he has been led astray by his 
assumption that all exercises of constitutional power must have limits, 
whether or not those limits are specified in the Constitution.  A more 
standard approach to the state police power is that it is not based on the 
idea of enumerated power at all, but is grounded on a plenary delegation 
of reserved powers to the states, as confirmed by the Tenth Amendment. 
For reasons that are difficult to discern, Barnett tries to specify the 
meaning of the state police power by taking an excursus into “Lockean 
political theory.”202  This leads him to conclude that the theory behind 
the Fourteenth Amendment is roughly consistent with the natural rights 
theory behind the 1787 Constitution.203  He does note that the police 
power was often construed to encompass efforts to control the morals of 
the public as well as to preserve its health and safety.204  Barnett thinks 
that this was a mistake and that the police power ought not to extend so 
far.  He then employs Howard Gillman’s historical research to build a 
 199. BARNETT, supra note 1, at 277. 
 200. Id. at 321. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 327. 
 203. Id. at 328. 
 204. Id. at 329. 
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case that the police power of the states cannot be used to benefit a 
particular class of persons.205
In his final chapter, Barnett sets out a scheme for courts to follow in 
assessing the necessity and propriety of legislation.  He takes his inspiration 
from First Amendment jurisprudence.  To assess necessity, the government 
must show a sufficient fit between means and ends and then demonstrate 
that it used the means least restrictive of liberty.206  Interestingly, he 
more or less abstains from trying to illustrate the implications of his 
theory for constitutional doctrine.  As a constitutionalist, Barnett is hard 
core: get the structure right, he thinks, and let the results take care of 
themselves.207  After all, if we do not like the consequences, we can 
always amend the Constitution.  He does not consider the possibility that 
changing the Constitution through amendment is not a practical option. 
Barnett does give a few illustrations of the effect of following the 
presumption of liberty.  From his point of view, the presumption is 
already followed in First Amendment and substantive due process 
jurisprudence.208  If the presumption were to be extended further, in the 
manner his theory suggests, all crimes of possession, whether directed at 
firearms, drugs, or pornography, would be unconstitutional.209  They are 
unconstitutional at the federal level because the Commerce Clause does 
not permit Congress to prohibit their possession.210  They are unconstitutional 
at the state level because the state police power does not extend to 
actions that do not pose a risk of violating the rights of others.211  
Further, efforts to regulate interstate pollution that result from 
manufacturing or agriculture cannot be handled within the boundaries of 
the present Constitution.212  Barnett thinks a constitutional amendment is 
necessary to handle the problem of pollution and that one would be 
ratified easily.213
Some of the most troubling implications of Barnett’s theory come 
from its restoration of pre-New Deal constitutional baselines.  So 
conditions of labor would be once again off limits to national legislation 
 205. Id. at 331–33. 
 206. Id. at 336. 
 207. Id. at 345. 
 208. Id. at 347. 
 209. Id. at 349. 
 210. Id. at 348–49. 
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 212. Id. at 350–51. 
 213. Id. at 351. 




because labor contracts are somehow not commerce or indispensable 
elements of interstate commercial enterprises.214  Unlike the example of 
interstate pollution, Barnett does not favor a constitutional amendment 
to allow regulation of conditions of labor.  From his point of view, 
minimum wage laws and presumably much of the regulation of 
conditions of labor should remain off-limits to the national government.  
Again, while libertarians presumably need no persuasion on this score, 
those who think New Deal style regulation of labor conditions was long 
overdue will not find any arguments to persuade them in Barnett’s book. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In his conclusion, Barnett affirms that “[t]he original meaning of the 
entire Constitution, as amended, is much more libertarian than the one 
selectively enforced by the Supreme Court.”215  He feels that this is 
compelled by the evidence he has assembled of the Constitution’s original 
meaning.  But Barnett cannot explain why we have departed from the 
original meaning.  He cites “political agendas”216 without being specific. 
There is something incongruous about theories that claim that we have 
“lost” the true meaning of the Constitution.217  If Barnett is right, we 
began losing the original meaning of the Constitution almost immediately 
after the government began operating in 1789.  Surely it is more plausible 
that the founding generation began disagreeing about the meaning of the 
Constitution, not that they deliberately set about “losing” it.  We have 
been disagreeing in principle ever since.  But disagreement does not 
involve losing anything.  Rather, when we began disagreeing, we found 
a tradition in which we could all participate while maintaining fidelity to 
the Constitution. 
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 217. For another theory in a similar vein, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990) (arguing that the integrity of 
the law has been undermined by judges viewing the Constitution as a malleable text that 
can be rewritten to suit pressing social agendas). 
